We present a stronger notion of veri able secret sharing and exhibit a protocol implementing it. We show that our new notion is preferable to the old ones whenever veri able secret sharing is used as a tool within larger protocols, rather than being a goal in itself.
Introduction
Secret Sharing and Veri able Secret Sharing VSS for short are fundamental notions and tools for secure cryptographic design. Despite the centrality and the maturity o f this concept almost 10 years passed from its original introduction, we shall advocate that a stronger and better de nition of a VSS is needed.
The intuitive notion of a VSS. As rst introduced by Chor, Goldwasser, Micali and Awerbuch in 3 , a VSS protocol consists of a two-stage protocol. Informally, there are n players, t of which m a y b e bad and deviate from their prescribed instructions. One of the players, the dealer, possesses a value s as a secret input. In the rst stage, the dealer commits to a unique value v no matter what the bad players may do; moreover, v = s whenever the dealer is honest. In the second stage, the already committed v alue v will be recovered by all good players again, no matter what the bad players might do.
Prior work. Several de nitions and protocols for VSS have been proposed in the past ten years E.g., 3, 1, 2, 4, 11 . We contend, however, that these notions and these protocols are of very limited use. In fact, their security concerns begin when the dealer's secret is committed, and end when it is recovered." Because in many applications running a single VSS protocol is exactly what is wanted, these prior de nitions and protocols are totally adequate in those scenarios. They are not, however, adequate in more general scenarios: when VSS is used as a tool towards other ends, that is, when it is used as a sub-protocol within a larger protocol. Indeed, and unfortunately, i t i s b y n o w a w ell-known phenomenon that protocols that are secure by themselves, cease to be secure when used as a sub-protocols. For instance, 4 used their VSS as a tool to reach Byzantine agreement, and thus had to argue that their overall protocol was secure from scratch" rather than in a modular way." Of course, such proofs from scratch tend to be overly long and complex.
Our work. In this paper we put forward a de nition of VSS that guarantees reducibility; that is, security e v en when VSS is used as a sub-routine in an otherwise secure protocol. A notion of security that guarantees reducibility has been presented by Micali and Rogaway 9 , but for the problem of function evaluation. W e t h us wish to extend reducibility-guaranteeing notions of security t o v eri able secret sharing protocols and concretely exhibit VSS protocols that provably satisfy these notions. More precisely, in this paper we a c hieve the following goals:
1. We propose a new de nition of VSS based on secure function evaluation This will guarantee the reducibility that characterizes the latter notion. 2. We compare our new notion with the previously proposed ones, and show that it is strictly and inherently stronger.
Indeed, though sometimes protocols proved to satisfy weaker properties also satisfy stronger ones, we shall also show that none of the previous VSS protocols can satisfy our new notion. 3. We modify an earlier VSS protocol of 1 and show that it is secure according to our notion.
Prior work
In order to focus on the di culties that are proper of VSS, in this extended abstract we shall deal with a simple computational model, both when reviewing prior work and when presenting our new one.
Computational Model. We consider n players communicating via a very convenient synchronous network. Namely, t o a void the use of Byzantine Agreement protocols we allow players to broadcast messages, and, in order to avoid the use of cryptography, w e assume that each pair of players is connected by a private communication channel i.e., no adversary can interfere with or have a n y access to messages between good players.
We model the corrupted processors as being coordinated by a n adversary A. This adversary will be dynamic i.e., decides during the execution of the protocol which processors corrupt; all-powerful: i.e., can perform arbitrarily long computations; and completely-informed i.e., when corrupting a player she nds out all his computational history: private input, previous messages sent and received, coin tosses, etc.. Further, the adversary is also allowed rushing i.e., in a given round of communication, bad players receive messages before the good ones and, based on the messages received by the bad players, the adversary can decide whom to corrupt next.
We s a y that such an adversary is a t-adversary 0 t n i f t is an upper bound on the number of processors she can corrupt t is also referred to as the fault-tolerance of the protocol. This computational model is precisely discussed in 4 and 9 .
the dealer; the output of player P i i s a v alue verification i 2 f yes; nog. In protocol Recover, the input of each player P i is his computational history at the end of the previous execution of Share-Verify; the output of each P i is a string i . We s a y P is a VSS protocol with fault-tolerance t if the following 3 properties are satis ed:
1. Acceptance o f g o od s e crets: In all executions of Share-Verify with a t-adversary A in which the dealer is good, verification i = yesfor all good players P i .
2. Veri ability: If less than t players output verification = no at the end of Share-Verify then at this time a value has been xed and at the end of Recover all good players will output the same value and moreover if the dealer is good = the secret. 1 3. Unpredictability In a random execution of Share-Verify with a good dealer and the secret chosen randomly in a set of cardinality m any t-adversary A won't be able to predict the secret better than at random i.e. if A outputs a number a at the end of Share-Verify then P r o b a = s = 1 m Secure Computation. Let us summarize the de nition of secure function evaluation of 9 . Informally the problem is the following: n players P 1 ; : : : ; P n , holding, respectively, private inputs x 1 ; : : : ; x n , w ant t o e v aluate a vector-valued function f on their individual secret inputs without revealing them more than already implied by f's output. That is, they want to compute y 1 ; : : : ; y n = fx 1 ; : : : ; x n such that each player P i will learn exactly y i .
This goal is easily achievable if there is an external and trusted party, who privately receives all individual inputs and then computes and privately hands out all individual outputs. Of course, even in this ideal scenario, the adversary can create some problems. She can corrupt a player P i before he gives his input x i to the external party and change it with some other numberx i . And she can still corrupt players after the function has been evaluated and learn their outputs. These problems should, however, be regarded as inevitable. Indeed, following 6 , 9 call a protocol for evaluating f secure if it approximates the above ideal scenario as closely as possible." The nature of this approximation is informally summarized below.
De nition Initial con guration, tra c, input and output: Let us de ne the following quantities within the context of a protocol P. The initial con guration for P i s a v ectorĩc, whose ith component, ic i = x i ; r i consists of the private input and the random tape of player P i .
The tra c of player P i in protocol P at round q, t q i , is the set of messages sent and received by P i up to that round. A local input functionĨ = I 1 ; : : : ; I n for P is an n-tuple of functions such that there exists a speci c round r such that, by applying I i to the tra c t r i , w e get the input player P i is contributing to the computation."Ĩĩc will denote the vector of those values when P is run on initial con gurationĩc. A local output functionÕ = O 1 ; : : : ; O n for P is an n-tuple of functions such that by applying O i to the nal tra c t final i of player P i we get his output.
De nition Adversary view: The adversary view, V I E W A Network , during P is the probability distribution over the set of computational histories tra c and coin tosses of the bad players.
De nition Simulator and ideal evaluation oracle: A simulator Simis an algorithm that plays the role of the good players". The adversary interacts with the simulator as if she was interacting with the network. The simulator tries to create a view for the adversary that is indistinguishable from the real one. He does this without knowing the input of the players, but it is given access to a special oracle called the ideal evaluation oracle. F or a protocol P with local input functionĨ evaluatable at round r, the rules of the interaction between Simand the oracle are the following: De nition 2 secure function evaluation Let f b e a v ector-valued function, P a protocol, Sima simulator, andĨ andÕ local input and output functions. We s a y that P securely evaluates the function f if Correctness: Ifĩc is the initial con guration of the network, then
1. x i = I i ĩc for all good players P i 2. with high probability,Õt final = fĨĩc I.e. no matter what the adversary does, the function is evaluated during the protocol on some de nite inputs de ned by the local input functions over the tra c of the players. These inputs coincide with the original inputs for the good players Privacy: For all initial con gurationsĩc, i f V I E W A Sim is the adversary view of the simulated execution of the protocol, we h a ve that V I E W A Network V I E W A Sim I.e., the two views are statistically indistinguishable.
There are many reasons for which this de nition captures correctly the notion of a secure computation. In particular, the following one: the 9 de nition allows one to prove formally many desirable properties of secure protocols, the most interesting for us being reducibility: Theorem 1 9 Let f and g be two functions. Suppose there i s a p r otocol P that securely evaluates f in the model of computation in which it can perform ideal evaluation of g. Suppose also that there i s a p r otocol Q that securely computes g. Denote with P Q the protocol in which the code for Q is substituted i n P in the places where P ideally computes g. Then P Q is secure.
Interested readers are referred to the original 80-page! paper 9 for a proof of this statement and a complete and a formal description of their de nition.
Our de nition of VSS
In this section we provide a new de nition of VSS that guarantees reducibility. The key idea for achieving this property is to cast VSS in terms of secure function evaluation. Accordingly, w e shall de ne two special functions shar and rec, and demand that both of them be securely evaluated in the sense of 9 .
We assume a network of n players P 1 ; : : : ; P n,1 and P n , where P n = D the dealer.
L e t = f0; 1g . Consider the vector space n and the following metric on it:
given two v ectorsã;b in n , let us de ne the distance between them as the number of components in which they di er; that is, dã;b = jf1 i n; a i 6 = b i gj We de ne the t-disc ofã as the set of points at distance t fromã i.e. disc t ã = fb 2 n : dã;b tg
We will de ne again VSS as a pair of protocols, called Share-Verify and Recover, that compute, respectively, t wo functions, shar and rec, satisfying the following properties.
shar is the function we use to share the secret among the players. It is de ned on the entire space for the n , 1 players their private input does not matter in this phase and on two nite special sets R and S for the dealer. S is the space of possible secrets while R is a set of random strings. We will ask even after seeing any l shares l t all secrets are equally likely to generate those shares. We call this property t-uniformity see 2 below.
Similarly rec is the function we use to reconstruct the secret. We will run it on the output of the previous phase. What we w ant is that we will be able to do so even if up to t components of the output of the sharing process are arbitrarily changed. We call this property t-robustness of the function rec see 3 below. De nition 3 A VSS protocol of fault-tolerance t is a pair of protocols Share-Verify, Recover such that Share-Verify securely evaluates the functionỹ = sharx 1 ; : : : ; x n,1 ; r s, Recover securely evaluates the function recỹ, and shar and rec are a sharing-reconstructing pair with parameter t.
Remarks: Though the above de nition may appear tailored on some speci c VSS protocols," in the nal paper we shall argue that it does not loose any generality.
Also, as we shall see below, by demanding that both components and particularly the second one of a share-reconstructing pair be securely evaluated, we are putting an unusually strong requirement on a VSS protocol. But it is exactly this requirement that will guarantee the desired reducibility property. 2 In 4 they use the terminology sequence p r otocols for this kind of interaction between two protocols 4 Comparison with previous de nitions of VSS Let us compare now De nition 3 and De nition 1, our token example of prior VSS de nitions. To begin with, there is a minor syntactical di erence between the two de nitions: according to De nition 1 when good players nd out the dealer is bad they just stop playing and output verification = no. In our new de nition instead the computation goes on, no matter what. This discrepancy can be eliminated by having protocols in the rst de nition agree on a default value when the dealer is clearly bad and protocols in the second de nition always output verification = yes at the end of Share-Verify since we are dealing with a secure funciton evaluation, we are guaranteed that all good players will output a common value.
With these minor changes we can prove the following:
Theorem 2 If P is a VSS protocol of fault-tolerance t satisfying De nition 3, then P is also a protocol of fault-tolerance t satisfying De nition 1.
Sketch of Proof First, P satis es the Veri ability property of De nition 1. Indeed because of the t-robustness of the function rec we h a ve that at the end of the phase Share-Verify a v alue has been xed and all the good players will output this value at the end of the Recover part. This is the value that can be obtained by applying the function rec to the output of the function shar. Because of the trobustness property it does not matter that t bad players may c hange their input before computing rec. Moreover if the dealer is good this value is equal to the secret s. Second, P also satis es the Unpredictability property of De nition 1. Notice that because of the t-uniformity property it is impossible in an information-theoretic sense to predict the secret better than at random for any algorithm that has knowledge of only l t components of the output of the function shar. A n y t-adversary has that knowledge but she also has a view of the entire protocol. But here is where the secure computation comes to our rescue. Because of the security of the evaluation of the function shar the adversary can create the entire view by herself using the simulator, and so basically the other information is irrelevant. So it's impossible for any t-adversary to predict the secret better than at random. Details of the proof will be presented in the nal paper.
Are De nitions 3 and 1 equivalent? That is, if a given VSS protocol P 0 satis es De nition 1, does it also satisfy De nition 3? The answer to this important question, provided by the following Theorem 3, is NO. And it better be that way i f w e w ant t o preserve reducibility of VSS protocols.
Theorem 3 De nition 3 is stricly stronger than De nition 1, that is, there a r e VSS protocols satisfying De nition 1, but not De nition 3.
We will prove this theorem formally in the nal paper, but let us address here some of the intuition behind the proof. We start with an easier point. Consider a VSS protocol P, satisfying De nition 1, in which the secret is a 3-colorable graph. During the Recover protocol the graph is reconstructed together with a 3-coloring of it kindly provided by the dealer. Notice that De nition 1 is not violated, but notice also that an adversary gains from the execution of such a protocol some knowledge about the secret she could not obtain by herself. This in turns means that there exists no simulator for this protocol and so that De nition 3 cannot be satis ed. And the serious problem with P is that, if used inside a larger protocol in which it is crucial that the knowledge of that particular 3-coloring stays hidden, P, though secure" as a VSS protocol on its own, jeopardizes the security of the larger protocol.
This problem with De nition 1 could be easily solved by substituting property 3 unpredictability with a stronger one based on zero-knowledge and simulatability o f Share-Verify. In 4 they shortly address this point. But, still, this would not solve all the problems. Indeed, another important di erence between our de nition and the previous one is that we require the computation of the function rec to be secure, i.e. simulatable. VSS protocols usually perform the Recover phase by h a ving each player distribute his share to the others. This is not simulatable.
Lemma 1 Distributing the shares is not a secure c omputation of the function rec.
In other words we w ant that, when we compute recỹ o verỹ = sharv 1 ; : : : ; v n,1 ; r s, no knowledge aboutỹ should leak except the secret s. The rationale for asking this is again the fact that we w ant our VSS protocols to be secure not just by themselves but when used inside subroutines of more complex protocols. Leaking knowledge about the shares may create problems to the security of the overall protocol.
Probably one of the reasons this point w as missed before was that in Shamir's secret sharing scheme the shares consist of the value of a polynomial of degree t with free term s. For a t-adversary who corrupts exactly t players, knowing the secret is equivalent to knowing the shares of all players. In fact, knowing the t shares of the corrupted players and the secret at the end of Recover, she has t + 1 points of the t-degree polynomial, and by e v aluating the so infered polynomial at the names of all good players, she easily computes all shares. However, we object that what happens to be true for the VSS protocols based on Shamir's scheme, may not be true for all VSS protocols. And one should not wire in" a general de nition what happens to be true in a speci c case. Moreover, even in Shamir-based VSS protocols, if the polynomial has degree bigger than the number of corrupted players, then it is no longer true that knowledge of the secret is equivalent to knowledge of all shares. In fact, one may e v en use such a protocol both for veri ably secret sharing a given value and for, say, ipping a coin. It is thus needed that the knowledge gainable by an adversary at the end of a secure VSS protocol exactly coincides with the original secret whenever the dealer is honest.
A VSS protocol that satis es our de nition
In the nal paper, we shall demonstarte that Rabin's VSS protocol can be modi ed so as to yield a VSS protocol, secure in our sense and with fault-tolerance n=2. For the time being, we will be content of exhibiting a simpler VSS protocol secure in our sense and with fault-tolerance n=3, by modifying an older protocol of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson 1 . The modi cation actually occurs only in the Recover part, and uses techniques also developed by 1 , but within their computational protocol" rather than in their VSS protocol.
Let n = 3 t+1 and P 1 ; : : : ; P n,1 ; P n = D be the set of players, D being the dealer. We will make all our computations modulo a large prime p 2 2n . Let ! be a primitive n-th root of the unity i n Z p . I t i s k n o wn from the error-correcting codes theory that if we e v aluate a polynomial f of degree t over the n di erent points ! i for i = 1 ; : : : ; n then given the sequence s i = f! i then we can reconstruct the coe cients of the polynomial in polynomial time even if up to t elements in the sequence are arbitrarily changed. For details on this error-correcting encoding of a polynomial known as the Reed-Solomon code readers can refer to a standard text like 10 . Let m be a security parameter. Proof To be presented in the full paper. No proof of this protocol has yet appeared.
The Recover protocol is modi ed with respect to the one in 1 in order to make it a secure computation of the function rec.
Protocol Recover Modi ed:
1. Each player P i chooses random polynomials p i x; q i1 x; : : : ; q im x all with free term 0. He sends to player P j the values p i ! j ; q i1 ! j ; : : : ; q im ! j 2. Each player P i broadcasts nm random bits i k;l 3. Each player P i broadcasts the following polynomials r j = q ij + jmodn i;j p i for each j = 1 ; : : : ; m 4. Each player P i checks that the information player P k sent him in round 1 is consistent with what player P k broadcasted in round 3. If there is a mistake o r P k broadcasted a polynomial with non-zero free term broadcasts bad k 5. If there are more than t + 1 players broadcasting bad k , player P k is disquali ed and all the other players assume 0 to be P k 's share. 6. Each player P i distributes to all other players the following value s i + p 1 ! i + p 2 ! i + : : : + p n ! i then interpolates the polynomial Fx = f 0 x + p 1 x + p 2 x + : : : + p n x using the error correcting algorithm of Solomon and Reed. The secret will then be s = F0 = f0.
Let rec be the function Proof Omitted. Will be presented in the full paper.
And so it follows that Theorem 4 The protocol P = Share , Verify; Recover is a VSS protocol according to De nition 3 with fault-tolerance n 3 Sketch of Proof Immediate from Lemmas 2 and 3 once we prove that shar and rec are a sharing-reconstructing pair of parameter n 3 . But this is obvious from the properties of polynomials and of the Reed-Solomon encoding. Details in the nal paper.
Conclusion
In the past cryptographic schemes and protocols used to be considered secure until not broken. Due to the increasing use and importance of cryptography, this approach is no more acceptable. To call a protocol secure we need a proof of its security. This means that we need de nitions and methods to be able to prove security.
Following this philosophy w e h a ve presented a new and stronger de nition for one of the most important cryptographic protocols: Veri able Secret Sharing. We argued that this de nition is the correct one especially when VSS is to be used as a sub-protocol inside larger protocols which is probably the most common case for VSS. We nally presented a protocol which provably satis es our new de nition.
